Skill Investment, Farm Size Distribution and Agricultural Productivity by Cai, Wenbiao
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Skill Investment, Farm Size Distribution
and Agricultural Productivity
Wenbiao Cai
University of Iowa
9. January 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28049/
MPRA Paper No. 28049, posted 14. January 2011 01:44 UTC
Skill Investment, Farm Size Distribution and
Agricultural Productivity∗
Wenbiao Cai †
January 9, 2011
Abstract
This paper addresses the question why agricultural productivity is so low in poor
countries. World Census of Agriculture reveals that agricultural production is of much
smaller scale in developing countries. I construct a two-sector OLG model where agri-
cultural production is carried out by heterogeneous farmers. At the farm level, optimal
scale and productivity is tied to the farmer’s idiosyncratic skill, which can grow over
time as a result of optimal investment. At the aggregate, self-selection determines
the average skill of farmers and hence the measured agricultural productivity. The
calibrated model can explain almost all of the differences in agricultural productivity
between the 80th and 20th percentile countries in the sample. Endogenously generated
farm size distributions are close to the actual ones as well.
JEL Classification: O11, O13, O41
Keywords: Income differences, agricultural productivity, skill investment, farm size
distribution.
1 Introduction
The agricultural sector in poor countries appears disproportionately unproductive, yet em-
ploys most of the labor force1. Low living standards are driven by both high labor share and
∗I thank B.Ravikumar for continuous encouragement and guidance. All errors are my own.
†Department of Economics, University of Iowa. Email: wenbiao-cai@uiowa.edu.
1See Gollin et al. [2004, 2007], Caselli [2005], Restuccia et al. [2008]
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low labor productivity in the traditional sector. A counterfactual calculation will illustrate
this point succinctly. If all countries would have the U.S. agricultural productivity, and
maintain their own labor allocation and nonagricultural productivity, cross-country income
differences would almost disappear2. Hence the key question is why productivity is so low
in the agricultural sector of poor countries.
This paper addresses this question by focusing on the scale of production in the farming
sector, which exhibits vast variation across countries, as I will document later. Farming
in poor countries are shown to be of much smaller scale compared to rich countries. I
incorporate this feature into a model, in which optimal scale is determined by the skill of
farmers using a span-of-control framework of Lucas [1978]. In poor countries, the average
farmer possesses low skill as a result of self-selection and suboptimal investment in skill
growth. As a result, the agricultural sector operates in small scale and has low measured
labor productivity.
I take advantage of the recently available World Census of Agriculture (WCA [1990,2000])
published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. FAO
compiles national agriculture censuses and presents summary statistics in a common format.
The data are internationally comparable and cover a large set of countries in different phases
of development. From the data, I construct the distribution of farms in different size cate-
gories for a sample of 40 countries. The main findings are: (1) Mean holding size3 positively
and strongly correlates with income level. Figure 1 (left panel) plots mean farm size (log)
against income per worker (log) in 1996. Mean farm size ranges from below 1 hectare in the
poorest countries to above 1000 hectares in the richest countries; (2) Agricultural production
in low income countries concentrates disproportionately on very small farms. Figure 1 (right
panel) plots the (average) farm size distributions of two sets of countries (rich and poor)4.
In Uganda, for example, 73% of the farms operate with less than 5 hectares of land. In
contrast, 50% of the farms in the U.S. exceed 50 hectares in size.
Using data from U.S. census of agriculture, I find larger farmers to be markedly more
productive, relative to the smaller ones. In terms of output per worker, it is not uncommon
2Even if all countries have the U.S. relative productivity (agriculture/nonagriculture) and maintain their
own labor allocation and nonagricultural productivity, would shrink income differences to a factor of 6, from
a factor of 32, between the 90th and 10th percentile countries.
3 In WCA, a holding is defined as “an economic unit of agricultural production under single management
comprising all livestock kept and all land used wholly or partly for agricultural production purposes, without
regard to title, legal form, or size”
4Rich countries: U.S, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland. Poor countries: Uganda, Burkina Faso,
Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
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Figure 1: Scale of Production in Agriculture Across Income Levels
to observe a 16-fold gap between a 2000+-acre farm and a 50-acre farm in 2007, as illustrated
in Figure 2. In value added terms, the productivity differences are even more pronounced -
by a factor of 30 between the maximum and minimum scale5. These productivity differences
appear robust in earlier censuses (92, 97 and 02) as well. While WCA does not report farm
productivity by size category, international evidences are available from studies of individual
countries6. These studies all point to a positive correlation between farm size and labor
productivity7. Given increasing labor productivity with size, differences in the composition
of farms clearly map into differences in measured labor productivity in the agricultural
sector. Quantitatively, in Appendix 5.2 I show that differences in the composition of farms
can account for around 1/3 of the observed variation in agricultural productivity for a sample
of 40 countries.
In essence agricultural productivity is viewed to be determined by two things: how pro-
ductive the economy is overall and how productive the individuals self-selecting into the
agricultural sector are. In this paper, the former is exogenous and inferred from data. The
latter, however, is determined endogenously through two channels: occupation choice and
skill investment. In the model, individuals are heterogenous in their “farming skill”, which
is intended to capture their idiosyncratic productivity in the agricultural sector8. Farmers
5Substantial differences remain when productivity is measured residually. Computed Solow residual
ranges from 3 to 5 times higher in the largest farms, relative to the smallest ones.
6See Fan and Chan-Kang [2005] for a set of asian countries; Byiringiroa and Reardon [1996] for Rwanda
7There is a large literature debating the relation between farm size and land productivity. See Feder
[1985] and reference therein
8Assuncao and Ghatakb [2003] also introduce a notion of farming skill, and analyze how this unobserved
characteristic of farmers affects the measured correlation between farm size and land productivity in a partial
equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Productivity by Size of Farm
act as price takers and retain residual profit. Outside the agricultural sector, wage work is
available, which does not reward their farming skill. I deviate from the otherwise standard
Lucas’ span-of-control framwork by allowing skill accumulation in a dynamic environment.
This modification serves three purposes. First, it allows calibrating the model to the ob-
served farm size distribution in the U.S, and hence provides reasonable identification of the
underlying distribution of idiosyncratic skill types. Second, the model with skill accumula-
tion is consistent with another cross-section data in the U.S. farming sector - older operators
operate larger, more productive farms than their younger peers. Table 5 in Appendix shows
the evolution of productivity over operator’s life cycle is nontrivial. Lastly, this paper stresses
the importance of skills, as opposed to distortions, in understanding agricultural productiv-
ity differences9. In particular, I explore how economic forces affect the accumulative process
and hence the agricultural productivity in equilibrium.
The central question of interest is whether the model can quantitatively explain the
observed cross-country variation in labor allocation, agricultural productivity and scale of
production. I first calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. Then I ask the model to
make quantitative predictions for each country in the sample by varying two country-specific
variables: aggregate efficiency and land endowment. The model is able to pick-up almost
all of the differences in agricultural productivity, and 80% of the differences in agricultural
employment between the 80th percentile and 20th percentile countries. Moreover, the model
not only captures the differences in mean farm size across countries, but also generates farm
size distributions that are remarkably close to the actual ones for a large set of countries,
9The importance of human capital in understanding aggregate productivity differences have been empha-
sized in Lucas [1988], Manuelli and Seshadri [2005], Erosa et al. [2010], among others
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which is rather surprising given its simple structure.
This paper is related to a large literature that studies cross country income differences,
eg., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [1997], Prescott [1998], Hall and Jones [1999]. Recent de-
velopment in the literature stresses the role played by the agricultural sector in under-
standing aggregate income differences. Within the level accounting framework, ignoring the
dual structure of the economy either results in substantial bias in computed efficiency as in
Cordoba and Ripoll [2005] and Chanda and Dalgaard [2008], or disguises the potential gains
from eliminating misallocations between sectors, as in Vollrath [2009]. Other studies explore
the effects of various distortions on agricultural and aggregate productivity within a general
equilibrium framework. Restuccia et al. [2008] argue that distortions in intermediate inputs
are quantitatively important for understanding cross country differences in agricultural and
aggregate productivity. Adamopoulos [2006] documents large differences in transportation
costs across countries, and show that theses differences can account for a sizeable share of in-
come differences. Using a unique micro level data set, Gollin and Rogerson [2010] investigate
the role of transportation cost in economic development in Uganda. Unlike these studies,
this paper focuses on idiosyncratic productivity of individuals, and how it affects aggre-
gate productivity through self-selection. In this respect, it is similar to Waugh and Lagakos
[2009]. The authors argue that agricultural productivity is low in poor countries because
of poor specialization. However, this paper focuses on differences in the scale of production
in the agricultural sector, and uses farm size distribution to discipline the underlying skill
distribution. After completing the paper, a recent study by Restuccia and Adamopoulos
[2009] was brought to my attention. Both papers focus on farm size heterogeneity across
countries and use a version of Lucas’ span-of-control model to endogenously generate a size
distribution. However, this paper highlights the role of skill accumulation in explaining cross
country variation in farm size distribution and agricultural productivity, which is abstracted
from in their paper.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the model.
In section 3, I calibrate the model and discuss the results. Section 4 presents the conclusion.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Each period a continuum of mass one individuals are born, and live for T periods. Individ-
uals of the same cohort constitute a household, with all decisions made by a hypothetical
5
household head. When born, individuals within a household draw independently their skill
type, z, from a known, time invariant distribution G(z). The instantaneous utility function
of a household is given by
U(ca, cn) = η · log(ca − a¯) + (1− η) · log(cn)
where (ca, cn) denote, respectively, agricultural consumption and nonagricultural consump-
tion at the household level. η dictates the relative taste towards two consumption goods. a¯
can be interpreted as subsistence consumption level. a¯ > 0 implies an income elasticity of
agricultural consumption less than unity. Each member is endowed with one unit of physical
time. Households equally own the stock of land L¯. There is no growth in the population nor
lifetime uncertainty.
2.2 Household Decision
In this economy, there are two occupations. Each member can either work as a worker or a
farm operator. All workers, regardless of skill type, earn the same wage rate. A farm operator
combines her skill (z), labor (ha) and land (ℓ) to produce agricultural output according to
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
hαa · ℓ
1−α
)γ
where A represents the efficiency level. There are competitive rental markets for Labor and
land at prices w and q, and output are sold at price p. All prices are expressed relative to
the price of nonagricultural output. The residual profit, or return to skill, π(z) is retained
by the farm operator. It is simple to show
π(z) = z · (1− γ) · (P ·A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
Although the initial realization is drawn exogenously, skill can subsequently grow through
investment according to the following technology
zt+1 = zt + zt · s
θ
t
where st is the fraction of physical time devoted to skill augmentation. Note that this
technology assumes time as the sole input. This is done for several reasons. First, it allows
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for closed-form solutions and clearer expositions. Second, data on time allocations of farm
operators are available to discipline relevant parameters. Lastly, data on resources investment
by farm operators in skill accumulation are limited, if available at all.
The household head chooses for each member an occupation, which by assumption can
not change over time. Then the household head chooses sequences of skill investment and
consumption to solve
max :
T∑
t=1
βtu(cat, cnt)
s.t :
T∑
t=1
ptcat + cnt∏t
τ=1Rτ
≤ Y
where Rτ denotes the interest rate in period τ = 1, 2, ..., T , and Y represents the maximized
discounted income of the household. The following lemmas establish some results that
characterize the stationary equilibrium, where all prices are constant.
Lemma 1 Workers don’t spend time accumulating skills.
This follows naturally from the assumption that all workers earn the same wage rate w
regardless of skill type. Thus it is not optimal for a worker to invest in skill accumulation.
Discounted lifetime income of a worker is simply Yw =
∑T
t=1w · R
1−t. In contrast, since
residual profit is strictly increasing in skill input, concavity ensures skill investment profitable
for all farm operators. The following lemma characterizes the optimal investment profile of
farm operators.
Lemma 2 Optimal time investment is independent of initial skill type
The proof is given in Appendix. The lemma implies a common slope of skill profile for all
farm operators, and the level is determined by the initial draw. It is convenient to define
variable xt as follows
xt =

1, t = 1xt−1 · (1 + sθt−1), t = 2, ..., T
{xt}
T
t=1 summarize the level of skill at time t relative to when born for an operator. Clearly,
{xt} is independent of type. This allows a simple expression of lifetime discounted income
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of a type z farm operator
Yf(z) = π(z) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) · R
1−t
Note that Yf(z) is linear and strictly increasing in skill type z. Recall that discounted lifetime
income of a worker (Yw) is independent of skill type z. This leads to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 There exists a cut-off level of skill type, z¯, such that household members with
skill type z < z¯ become workers, and household members with skill type z ≥ z¯ become farm
operators.
The most able members will operator farms and utilize their skills. The less able members
will supply inelastically one unit of labor to the market, and forgo their endowed skills.
The marginal operator, whose skill type is z¯, is indifferent between two occupations. The
maximized discounted income of the household is
Y = G(z¯) · Yw +
∫
z¯
Yf(z)dG(z) + q · L¯/T ·
T∑
t=1
R1−t
2.3 Nonagriculture Firm’s Optimization
There is a representative firm that produces nonagricultural output with a linear technology
Yn = A · Hn. Two remarks are in order. First, efficiency parameter A augments both
agricultural and nonagricultural production, and hence is sector neutral. This technology
parameter is intended to capture factors impacting all economic activities within an economy.
Second, Hn denotes labor hours and does not embed skills. The representative firm solves
max
{Hn}
A ·Hn − w ·Hn
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices (w, p, q, R), consumption and in-
vestment (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1, factor demand ha(z), ℓ(z), Hn such that: (1) given prices, (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1
solve household income maximization problem; (2) given prices, ha(z), ℓ(z) solve farm oper-
ator’s profit maximization problem, and Hn solve nonagricultural firm’s profit maximization
problem; (3) Prices are competitive; (4) All markets clear.
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To solve the model, I begin by solving for prices (p, q). Equation (1) below states that
the type z¯ household member must be indifferent between working and operating a farm.
Equation (2) below states the land market clearing condition.
π(z¯) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) · R
1−t =
T∑
t=1
w · R1−t (1)
∫
z¯
ℓ(z)dG(z) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) = L¯ (2)
Dividing (1) by (2) yields an expression of the rental price of land
q =
[ ∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st)∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st) · R
1−t
]
·

γ · (1− α) ·
(∑T
t=1w · R
1−t
)
(1− γ) · L¯

 ·
∫
z¯
zdG(z)
z¯
(3)
Substituting (3) into (1) yields the relative price of agricultural good
p =
[ ∑T
t=1w · R
1−t
z¯ · (1− γ) ·
∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st) · R
1−t
]1−γ
·
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α)−γ
·
1
A
(4)
Note the relative price of agricultural good is strictly decreasing in the cut-off type z¯ and
aggregate TFP. Solving for optimal consumption bundles and aggregating over generations
yields the aggregate demand of two consumption goods
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯ (5)
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cnt =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η) (6)
Detailed derivations are given in appendix.
In each household, the measure of workers is G(z¯). Given constant prices, the division of
labor does not change across cohorts. Hence the total measure of worker is simply T ·G(z¯).
The measure of workers demanded in agricultural production is Ha =
[∑T
t=1 xt(1− st)
]
·∫
z¯
ha(z)dG(z). Imposing labor market clearing, the measure of workers in the nonagricultural
sector is Hn = T · G(z¯) − Ha. The output in the nonagricultural sector is Yn = A · Hn. In
the agricultural sector, aggregating production over farmers yields aggregate production
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Ya =
[∑T
t=1 xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
ya(z)dG(z). Good markets clearing conditions requires Ca =
Ya, Cn = Yn. By Walras’law, loan market clears as well.
In the standard Lucas’ span-of-control model, threshold skill level is independent of
TFP. In this model, however, threshold level increases with TFP. This highlights the main
mechanism through which the model is able to reconcile high labor share and low labor
productivity in agriculture of low income countries. Low TFP transforms into low wage
payment, and hence renders farming more lucrative for even low skill household members,
because the price of agriculture output rises more than proportionately to offset the decline
in TFP. Employment in agriculture increases, yet average skill, and hence productivity,
decreases. To see this, consider two economies with two efficiency levels Ar, Ap. In addition
assume that Ar = g ·Ap with g > 1. The former can be interpreted as a typical rich country,
and the latter a poor one. Holding land endowment fixed, the model predicts a lower
skill threshold and a higher interest rate in the poor country. For a simple proof, assume
the threshold level of skill and interest rate are the same. From equation (3), it is straight
forward to see that qr = g ·qp. Given this, equation (4) implies pr = pp. These two conditions,
together with equation (5), further implies Yr = g · Yp, i.e., aggregate income is proportional
to aggregate TFP. Aggregate production of agricultural good is also proportional to TFP.
However, with nonhomothetic preferences, demand of agricultural consumption drops by
less than a factor of g in the poor economy, as suggested by equation (5). Excess demand
pushes up the price of agricultural consumption, and reduces the threshold level of skill.
This implies a higher labor share and lower productivity in the agricultural sector. Influx of
labor into the agricultural sector also reduces the supply of nonagricultural good and bids
up the equilibrium interest rate.
3 Calibration and Results
In this section, I parameterize the model. Model period is 10-years. Individuals are born at
the age of 25 and live for 5 periods. Assuming an annual discount rate of 0.96, I set β = 0.9610.
TFP for the U.S is normalized to be 1. Parameters in the agricultural production function
are directly inferred from agriculture value added data of the U.S. (see Appendix 5.3). Over
the period 1980-1999, the average share of output accruing to operators is 20%. I thus set
γ = 1 − 0.2 = 0.8. This parameter is critical to the quantitative implications of the model,
and deserves some discussions here. This paper is certainly not the first one to estimate
the span-of-control parameter, though most studies either assume a one-sector framework or
10
focus on the nonagricultural part of the economy. For studying the effects of size-dependent
policies on aggregate output, Guner et al. [2008] estimate the span-of-control parameter to
be 0.8 for the aggregate economy. A similar value is used in Restuccia and Rogerson [2008]
for studying the effects of idiosyncratic distortions at the plant level on aggregate output.
For the manufacturing sector alone, Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] obtain an estimate of 0.85. A
value of 0.8 for the agricultural sector appears roughly in line with these estimates10. Over
the same period, return to land and labor are almost identical, which suggests α = 0.5 is a
consistent value.
I restrict the skill type distribution to be lognormal with mean µ and standard deviation
σ. This leaves 5 parameters (a¯, η, L¯, µ, σ, θ) to be chosen simultaneously to match moments of
the U.S. economy. From World Development Indicator, agriculture employs 2% of the labor
force. I also target a long run agricultural employment share of 0.5%. This corresponds
to the asymptotic agricultural employment share when the subsistence consumption share
of income is effectively zero. To discipline θ, I turn to data on time allocations of farm
operators. Census of Agriculture reports the number of days off the farm for operators in 5
different age groups: 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+. From there I compute the total working
days, as well as the fraction supplied by operators in different age groups (see Appendix 5.4).
Within the model, this statistic corresponds to 1−si∑T
i=1 1−si
because operators of generation i
spend (1 − si) fraction of their time in farm production. I choose θ to reproduce the share
of operators aged 35-44. However, the implied shares of other operators are close to data
as well11. The model is also asked to reproduce the observed size distribution of farms in
the U.S.. Figure 3 plots the calibrated size distribution against data. By construction, the
model generated size distribution matches the data well. In addition, as depicted in Figure 4
in Appendix, the model also implies a land size distribution that fits the data very well, even
though it is not targeted. The model also generates a distribution of hired labor over size
classes that is reasonably close to the data 12. Parameter values are summarized in Table 6
in Appendix.
10Restuccia and Adamopoulos [2009] use a smaller value γ = 0.6, but they do not include hired labor in
their production function.
11See Table 7 in Appendix
12See Figure 5 in appendix. Hired labor is inferred using expenditure data assuming homogenous wage
rate across farms of different sizes.
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3.1 Quantitative Experiment
In this section I assess the model’s ability to quantitatively explain cross-country variations
in agricultural productivity. Data on sectoral productivity, sectoral labor shares and land
endowment are from Restuccia et al. (2008). The size distributions of farms are constructed
from the World Census of Agriculture (round 1990, 2000) published by Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations. These two data sets, however, are not directly
comparable because of time period differences. The data in Restuccia et al. (2008) pertain
to the year 1985. World Census of Agriculture is a collection of national agriculture censuses
conducted independently in each member country - possibly at different points of time (see
Table 10 for country specific census years). In principle, this study should be restricted to
countries where the agriculture census was conducted in 1985. As a first pass, however,
I merge these two data sets to obtain a sample of 40 countries with two defenses. First,
census of agriculture is conducted every 5 years in most countries, if at all available. It
is thus rather costly to obtain completely synchronized data set as detailed as the present
one. Second, even though census year in the sample ranges from 1980 to 2000. Most of the
countries indeed have their censuses conducted around 1990. The quantitative implications
of the model remain reasonable provided the composition of farms do not undergo drastic
changes over 5 years.
I test the model’s predictive ability by varying two country specific variables: the level of
TFP (A) and land endowment (L¯). All countries are otherwise identical. In particular, they
all face the same ex-ante distribution of skill types. Country specific Ai and L¯i are inferred
as follows
Ai =
ynlni
ynlnus
, L¯i =
LERi
LERus
· L¯us
where ynlni is the Nonagricultural GDP per worker of country i, and LERi is the Land-
employment ratio of country i. Both are directly available from Restuccia et al.(2008).
To assess the quantitative performance of the model, I focus on the following metrics:
agricultural labor share (La), real agricultural output per worker (ryala), real GDP per
worker (rgdp) and mean farm size (mfs). Note that agricultural employment includes both
workers working in the agricultural sector and farm operators. U.S price is used as interna-
tional price when computing aggregate output to make results comparable to the data, which
is PPP adjusted. To facilitate comparison between model predictions and the data, I divide
countries in the sample into quintile by GDP per worker in the data. Productivity in the
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richest quintile (Q.5) is normalized to be 1. The sample consists of 40 countries with good
representation of both developed and developing nations13. The results are summarized in
Table 1.
Quintile rgdp ryala La mfs
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Q.1 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.66 0.48 7 16
Q.2 0.30 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.22 56 43
Q.3 0.52 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.07 83 107
Q.4 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.48 0.08 0.05 68 69
Q.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.05 515 381
Table 1: Model vs Data, by Income Quintile
The model does an excellent job explaining productivity differences. In the sample,
the richest (Q.5) countries are about 8 times more productive overall and 25 times more
productivity in agriculture, relative to the poorest countries (Q.1). The model generates
almost the same magnitude of differences. As pointed out in the introduction, agricultural
productivity is viewed to be determined by two forces: overall efficiency and idiosyncratic
productivity of farmers. In the data, aggregate TFP - as inferred from nonagricultural
productivity, differs by at most a factor of 5 between the richest and poorest countries.
Hence, the first force accounts for about 50% of the differences in agricultural productivity.
The differences in idiosyncratic productivity of farmers explain the remaining half. Outside
the two ends of the world income distribution, the model explains the productivity differences
reasonably well - an notable exception is high income countries (Q.4), for which the model
substantially underpredicts their agricultural productivity14.
High employment and low labor productivity in agriculture are jointly driving low income.
It is thus important for the model to be consistent with data in terms of sectoral labor
allocation. For the top quintile countries, the model correctly predicts the employment
share in agriculture. For the bottom quintile countries, the model predicts a 48% agricultural
employment share - about 80% of the actual share. For low income countries (Q.2), the model
also predicts a lower agricultural labor share, compared to the data. This reflects other
forces at work. For example, high price of intermediate inputs, as discussed in Restuccia et
13Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Uganda, Dominica, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Tunisia, Switzerland, Portugal, Ecuador, Peru, Netherland, Belgium, Spain, Colombia,
Nicaragua, Ireland, Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, Venezuela, United Kingdom, Finland, Brazil,
Chile, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, United States
14Low land endowment and a relatively large elasticity of land are responsible for the counterfactual
prediction
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al. (2008), induces farm operators to substitute labor for modern input. This model also
abstracts from labor market distortions, while in low income countries barriers to sectoral
labor movements are common as evidenced by substantial gap in earnings. One famous
example is the Hukou system in China that imposes institutional restriction on immigration
from rural villages to urban cities. My results show that these distortions are also important
for understanding sectoral labor allocations.
The model also generates increasing mean farm size with income level, as observed in the
data. One important feature of this model is its ability to reproduce not only the mean farm
size, but also the entire farm size distribution across countries. In Appendix I plot the model
predicted farm size distributions along with their empirical counterparts for all countries in
the sample. Even though ex ante all countries face the same skill-type distribution, the ex
post size distribution of farms exhibits substantial variations across levels of income. For a
large set of countries the model generated size distributions are amazingly close to the data,
which I view as a success of the model.
One stylized fact regarding economic development is the declining importance of agricul-
ture in aggregate output - one available measure is agriculture value added as a percentage
of GDP. For the top quintile countries, the model predicts agricultural output to be 10%
of the aggregate output, while in the data it is 3%. For the bottom quintile countries, the
model predicts the value to be 70%, substantially higher than 30% in the data. Hence the
model captures correctly the declining share with income but fails to generate the exact lev-
els. Another testable aspect of the model is its prediction of the relative price of agricultural
output. A central prediction is that the relative price is higher in low income countries.
Using ICP data from the World Bank, I compute the relative price between “agricultural
consumption” and “nonagricultural consumption” for all available countries15. The relative
price in 2005 is around 4 times higher in the 10th percentile country, compared to the 90th
percentile country. Moreover, the model predicts the relative price to be about 2.8 times
higher in the poorest countries, which is roughly in line with the data.
Recall that in the model, countries are different in two dimensions: TFP and land endow-
ment. Which exogenous variable is relatively more important in determining productivity?
To shed light on this question, I perform a series of counterfactual experiments for a hy-
pothetical country that represents the poorest countries in the sample16. Relative to the
15“Agricultural consumption” is defined as food, non-alcoholic beverage, alcoholic beverage and tobacco.
“Nonagricultural consumption” is defined as the rest of individual consumptions plus capital consumption.
A similar calculation is done also in Waugh and Lagakos [2009]
16These countries are Burkina Faso, Uganda, India, Ivory Coast and Pakistan
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U.S, the representative poor country has 4.5 times lower TFP, and 2.1 times smaller land
endowment. To disentangle the relative contribution, I change one exogenous variable at a
time. Table 2 summarizes the results.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.5% 1/2 117
A only 24% 1/22 47
Both A and L¯ 53% 1/48 13
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 2: TFP versus Endowment
If the inferred TFP is maintained at the U.S. level, and land endowment is reduced by
half, equilibrium labor allocation and productivity change minimally, though mean farm
size drops by roughly a half. Differences in endowment alone can’t go far in explaining
agricultural labor share and productivity differences. In contrast, if inferred TFP is reduced
- with land endowment unchanged, there is a massive movement of labor into the agricultural
sector. Moreover, agricultural productivity drops by a factor of 22, and mean farm size drops
further to 47 hectares. TFP thus has a more profound impact on equilibrium allocations.
It is also interesting to note that the decomposition of TFP and land endowment is not
orthogonal. If both TFP and land endowment are reduced, the representative poor country
allocates 53% of the labor force to agriculture. Output per worker drops massively - by a
factor of 48. An average farm is only about one tenth the size of an average farm in the U.S..
3.2 Discussion
A novel and crucial feature of the model is to embed skill accumulation in an otherwise
standard Lucas’ span-of-control model. A similar idea was illustrated in Bhattacharya [2009],
who shows that skill accumulation is critical to quantitatively explain cross-country variation
in firm size distribution and income. While in that paper the main channel of variation
is coming from resources input in skill accumulation, in this model the main mechanism
operators through nonhomothetic preferences. To investigate the quantitative importance of
skill accumulation, I calibrate a version of the model without skill accumulation, and then
assess its quantitative prediction for the representative poor country. The model without
skill fails to generate the observed size distribution of farms in the U.S., although it can
reproduce the first moment. Moreover, given exogenous variables, the model without skill
accumulation in general explains less of the cross-section differences in labor allocation and
15
productivity. Details of calibration and results are postponed in Appendix.
As shown in Restuccia et al. [2008], barriers to intermediate inputs have sizeable impact
on labor allocation and productivity. That paper assumes a representative household. Here I
explore how barrier to intermediate inputs affect agricultural productivity in an environment
with idiosyncratic farmers. To do so, I modify the agricultural production technology to
incorporate intermediate input X
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
Xφ · hρ · ℓ1−φ−ρ
)γ
As in Restuccia et al. (2008), one unit of nonagricultural output can be consumed or
converted into intermediate good at the rate of π. There is a linear technology producing
nonagricultural output. For expositional purposes, I suppress skill accumulation to disentan-
gle the effects coming from distortions from those stemming from skill investment. Detailed
calibration and results are given in Appendix. As expected, the model explains more of
the differences in labor allocation and productivity when distortion in intermediate inputs
are included (58% vs. 48% in labor share, 33-fold vs. 28-fold differences in agricultural
productivity). Moreover, high price of intermediate inputs also reduces the mean farm size.
Several remarks on the limitations of the model are in order here. Firstly, land endowment
is approximated by land-employment ratio, and hence abstracts from possible differences
in the quality of land. Moreover, the calibrated share of land in agriculture production
is considerably large, compared to the common values used in the literature17. Secondly,
TFP level is mapped into nonagricultural output per worker. While this approach appears
reasonable for rich countries where minimum resources are devoted to the agricultural sector,
it is deemed less appropriate for poor countries where most of the economic activity takes
place in the traditional sector.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model that links agricultural productivity to the skills of farm
operators. In poor countries, subsistence need and low wage rate renders farming a better
option for even low skill individuals. As a result of self-selection, a large fraction of the
17Griliches [1964] estimates the share to be around 16% for the U.S., though his estimates are for the
period round 1950. For a cross-section, Hayami and V.W.Ruttan [1970] estimates the share of land to be in
a ball park of 10%. Hansen and Prescott [2002] uses a land share of 30% for the technology in the Malthus
era.
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labor force work in the traditional sector. Moreover, the average farm operator has low
skill and hence low measured labor productivity. The calibrated model can explain most of
the observed differences in agricultural productivity and labor employment. By allow skill
accumulation in an otherwise standard Lucas’ span-of-control framework, the model is able
to capture not only the differences in the mean farm size, but also the variation in the size
distribution across countries.
The agricultural sector characterized in this paper is “poor but efficient”, as articulated in
Schultz [1964]. This contrasts with studies that point to various distortions as explanations
of low agricultural productivity in poor countries. Instead, this paper stresses the importance
of skills in understanding sectoral productivity patterns, and hence provides an alternative
view of the observed cross-country differences in agricultural productivity.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 It is useful to first derive the profit function, where Π(z) = maxh,ℓ py − wh− ql.
Using F.O.C, it is easy to show that
π(z) =π˜ · z
where π˜ = (1− γ) · (P · A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
Profit function is thus linear in ability z. In a stationary equilibrium, prices are constant
over time. This implies constant profit per unit of skill. Thus farm operator’s problem can
be written as one that maximizes the sum of discounted lifetime skill.
max
st
:
t=T∑
t=1
R1−tt · zt · (1− st)
s.t : zt+1 = zt(1 + s
θ
t )
Let λt be the Lagrangian multiplier for period t
L =
T∑
t=1
R1−t · zt · (1− st)− λt(zt+1 − zt(1 + s
θ
t ))
F.O.Cs are
R1−t = λtθs
θ−1
t (7)
λt = R
−t(1− st+1) + λt+1(1− δt + s
θ
t ) (8)
From equation(9), if λt+1 is independent of beginning of period skill zt, then (λt) does not
depend on zt. Consequently the equation (8) the optimal time investment st does not depend
on zt as well. To solve the optimal path, I use backward induction. Clearly, it is optimal to
invest no time in the last period, sT = 0, λT = 0, and hence independent of zT−1. Using the
above argument, λT−1 and sT−1 does not depend on zT−1. Repeating this argument implies
that the entire path of investment is independent of initial skill type.
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Proof of Lemma 2 Life time budget constraint can be written as
T∑
t=1
pcat + cnt
Rt−1
≤ Y
where Y is the discounted lifetime income. The Lagrangian is
L =
∑
βt(ηlog(cat − a¯) + (1− η)log(cnt))− λ
[∑ pcat + cnt
Rt−1
− Y
]
F.O.C yields
βtη
cat − a¯
= λ
p
Rt−1
(9)
βt(1− η)
cnt
= λ
1
Rt−1
(10)
(1) divided by (2) yields the intratemporal allocation between two consumption goods as
p(cat − a¯)
cnt
=
η
1− η
. (11)
Iterating (1) and (2) one more period yields the usual intertemporal allocations
(ca,t+1 − a¯) = βR(cat − a¯) (12)
cn,t+1 = βRcnt (13)
Substitute F.O.C into budget constraints we have
T∑
t=1
p [·(ca1 − a¯) · (βR)
t−1 + a¯] + (βR)t−1 · cn1
Rt−1
= Y
→p · (ca1 − a¯) + cn1 =
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
→ca1 = η ·
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
/p+ a¯
cn1 = (1− η) ·
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
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Aggregate consumption at a point of time is given by
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cnt =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η)
5.2 Development Accounting Exercise
To simply the calculation, I assume that all farms in size class [sl, sh] have the same size
(sl+ sh)/2. Let si denote the mean farm size, and µi denote the corresponding share in class
i. In addition, let yi and hi denote, respectively, the output and labor. Using U.S. data, I
estimate the following equations
log ((y/h)i) = b1 + b2 · log(si)
log ((hl)i) = c1 + c2 · log(si)
Note that yi is measured by the total market sales of goods net of government payments,
and hi is measured by the sum of farm operators and hired workers. The methodology in
U.S. agriculture census assumes one farm operator per farm. Let ni note the number of
farms report hired labor, and let hli denote the number of hired labor, the total number of
worker in size class i is simply ni + hli. For 2007, the estimated coefficients are (b1, b2)
= (-0.916,0.548) and the R2 is 93% for the first regression. For the second regression, the
estimated coefficients are (c1, c2) = (1.62, 0.058) and the R2 is 72%. Given size distribution
µi over size class, then aggregate output per worker is computed as
Y =
∑
i
[(b1 + b2 · log(si)) · hi · µi]
hi =
(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi∑
i [(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi]
where the second equation gives the distribution of workers over size classes.
To compare against data, I compute the log-variance ratio as var(log(Ymodel))
var(log(Ydata))
. The numer-
ator is the variance of logarithm of agricultural productivity in the model. The denominator
is the variance of logarithm of agricultural productivity in the data. For the current sample,
this ratio is 26.5%.
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5.3 Estimating Return to Scale Parameters in Agriculture
According to the report by USD [1980-1989], Total output(YA), is the summation of crop
production, livestock production and revenues from services and forestry. Total output,
net of government transfers, are fully dissipated into the following factors of production:
intermediate inputs, capital, labor, land and operators. In the data, these components
corresponds to Purchased Inputs (PI), Capital Consumption plus Real Estate and Non Real
Estate Interest (CCI), Compensation to Hired Labor (CHL), Net Rent Received by Non-
operator Landlord (RL) and Net Farm Income (NFI), i.e.,
Y A = PI + CCI + CHL+RL+NFI
Here I implicitly assume that real estate and non real estate interest income are capital
income because structures are typically considered as a component of capital. Net farm
income represents “ entrepreneurial earnings of those individuals who share in the risks of
production and materially participate in the operation of the business”, and thus captures
the return to skills provided by farm operator. For the period 1980-1999, the estimated
income are given in the table blow.
1985 1980-1990 1990-1999 1980-1999
Intermediate 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.49
Capital 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.20
Labor 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Land 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Operator 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.20
Table 3: Factor Shares in U.S. Farming
5.4 Working Days by Age of Farm Operator
From 1992 census of agriculture, I extract the number of days not working on the farm for
farm operators by age (Panel A). To compute the the hours supplied by operator of a certain
age, I assume 250 working days a year. In addition, I use the midpoint of the interval as the
average days off farm. For example, “None” in the table means operators work 250 days a
year. Operators work 200 days if in interval “ 1-99 days”, 150 working days if in interval
“100-199 days”, and 25 working days if in interval “200 days+”. This allows me to compute
the total number of working days a year for operators in any age category. Finally, I compute
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the share of days supplied by operators in age group i (Panel B) as si =
wdi∑I
i=1 wdi
, where wdi
is the number of working days for operators in age group i.
Panel A
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total
None 52,938 104,375 110,380 158,629 249,512 675,834
1-99 days 18,015 29,804 25,428 27,061 19,267 119,575
100-199 days 7,872 14,648 14,308 12,423 6,169 55,420
200 days + 10,028 15,565 14,681 11,082 5,087 56,443
Panel B
Work Days (1000s) 17875 33908 34478 46589 66975
% Days 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Table 4: Days off Farm by Age of Operator
5.5 Scale and Productivity By Age of Farm Operator
The following table is restricted to farm operators whose primary occupation is farming.
Mean holding size is measured by acreage per farm. Productivity is measured by net cash
income of operators.
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Mean Holding Size 575 857 909 736 542
Net Cash Income 59,839 90,705 91,501 60,249 32,282
Source: 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol 1, Chapter 1: Table 63.
Table 5: Scale and Productivity over Life Cycle of Farm Operators
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5.6 Parameter Values
η a¯ θ L¯ µ σ
0.015 0.221 0.3157 0.7842 -3.1236 4.1693
Table 6: Parameter Values
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Data 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Model 0.08 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.29
Table 7: Time Share by Age of Operator: Model against Data
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Figure 3: Calibrated Size Distribution
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Figure 4: Implied Distribution of Land
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Figure 5: Implied Distribution of Hired Labor
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5.7 Model Performances
1. Baseline Model Prediction
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Figure 6: Model Prediction Against Data
2. Model without Skill Accumulation
I calibrate (η, a¯, µ, σ) to match: current agricultural employment (2%), long run agri-
culture employment (0.5%), Mean farm size (178) and coefficient of variation of farm
size distribution (0.5). I ask the model to predict for a representative poor country
with 4.5 times lower TFP and a 2.1 times smaller land endowment.
3. Model with Intermediate Inputs
I set γ = 0.8, φ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.2. For the U.S, π = 1. I choose (η, a¯, µ, σ) to target a
2% current agriculture employment, 0.5% long run agriculture employment, 2% share
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Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 3.3% 1/1.6 65
A only 26% 1/16 20
Both A and L¯ 48% 1/28 6
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 8: TFP versus Endowment (No Skill Accumulation)
of agriculture output of GDP, and the mean farm size. Again I ask the calibrated
model to predict equilibrium allocations for the representative poor country, which has
4.5 times lower TFP, 2.1 times smaller land endowment and 3 times higher relative
price of intermediate inputs.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.4% 1/1.2 88
A only 29% 1/17 18
π only 3.1% 1/1.6 135
A and L¯ 34% 1/20 7
A and π 49% 1/28 12
π and L¯ 3.6% 1/1.9 57
A, π and L¯ 58% 1/33 5
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 9: TFP versus Endowment (With Intermediate)
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5.8 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.1)
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5.9 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.2)
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5.10 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.3)
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5.11 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.4)
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5.12 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.5)
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Code rgdpwok MFS (Ha) No. Holding Area (Ha) Census Year
ARG 25715 468.97 378357 177437398 1988
AUS 46436 3,601.68 129540 466561000 1990
AUT 45822 26.42 273210 7217498 1990
BEL 50600 16.06 87180 1400364 1990
BFA 1824 2.79 886638 2472480 1993
BRA 18797 72.76 4859865 353611246 1996
CAN 45304 241.94 280043 67753700 1991
CHE 44152 11.65 108296 1262167 1990
CHL 23244 83.74 316492 26502363 1997
CIV 4966 3.89 1117667 4351663 2001
COL 12178 23.28 1547846 36033713 1988
DEU 42708 32.84 566900 18617900 1990
DNK 45147 34.14 81267 2774127 1989
DOM 12508 2.34 9026 21146 1995
ECU 12664 14.66 842882 12355831 1999
EGY 12670 0.95 3475502 3297281 1990
ESP 39033 18.79 2284944 42939208 1989
FIN 39611 61.88 199385 12338439 1990
FRA 45152 28.42 1006120 28595799 1988
GBR 40620 70.21 244205 17144777 1993
GRC 31329 4.50 802400 3609000 1995
HUN 21554 6.67 966916 6448000 1993
IND 9903 1.69 97155000 164562000 1985
IRL 47977 26.04 170578 4441755 1991
ITA 51060 7.51 3023344 22702356 1990
LKA 7699 0.81 1787370 1449342 2002
MAR 11987 5.84 1496349 8732223 1996
NIC 5697 31.34 199549 6254514 2001
NLD 45940 16.99 127367 2163472 1989
NOR 50275 9.97 99382 991077 1989
NZL 37566 223.43 70000 15640348 2000
PAK 6995 3.80 5071112 19252672 1990
PER 10240 20.15 1756141 35381809 1994
PRT 30086 6.74 594418 4005594 1989
SWE 40125 93.87 81410 7641890 1999
TUN 17753 11.58 471000 5455300 1994
UGA 1763 2.16 1704721 3683288 1991
URY 20772 288.31 54816 15803763 1990
USA 57259 186.95 2087759 390311617 1987
VEN 19905 60.02 500979 30071192 1997
Table 10: Summary Statistics of WCA
34
